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Abstract
This paper reviews the structure of standard quantum mechanics, introducing the
basics of the von Neumann-Dirac axiomatic formulation as well as the well-known Copen-
hagen interpretation. We review also the major conceptual difficulties arising from this
theory, first and foremost, the well-known measurement problem. The main aim of this
essay is to show the possibility to solve the conundrums affecting quantum mechanics via
the methodology provided by the primitive ontology approach. Using Bohmian mechan-
ics as an example, the paper argues for a realist attitude towards quantum theory. In the
second place, it discusses the Quinean criterion for ontology and its limits when it comes
to quantum physics, arguing that the primitive ontology programme should be considered
as an improvement on Quine’s method in determining the ontological commitments of a
theory.
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1 Introduction
In the context of naturalized metaphysics we are typically guided by the best scientific theories
available to inform our ontology; for instance, one may be ontologically committed to the
existence of genes, molecules and elementary particles, accepting the content of biological,
chemical and physical theories.
Notorioulsy, this received view on ontological commitment in analytic philosophy was
proposed by Quine (1948). In this seminal essay the author claimed that ontological questions
must be answered by looking at the content of the most advanced scientific theories at our
disposal, proposing the following method:
1. Select a set of statements considered true from the best scientific theories available;
2. Express these statements in the language of first-order predicate logic (regimentation
procedure);
3. Be ontologically committed to all and only the bound variables appearing in existentially
quantified sentences which make them true.
With Quine’s words:
A theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables
of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in
the theory be true. (Quine (1948), p. 33)
To take an elementary example, endorsing what our most advanced physical theories claim, we
accept the existence of electrons and hence, we consider true the quantified sentence “Electrons
exist”. Its translation into the language of first-order logic ∃xE(x) is useful to make clear what
entities we are ontologically committed to: in order for this sentence to be true, there must
be in the world a physical entity to which the bound variable x refers which satisfies the
predicate E(x), thus accepting this sentence we are committed to the existence of (at least)
one electron.
Interestingly, the first step requires that, relatively to a specific domain, there is a deci-
sional element to establish which is the best theory among possible competitors in order to
choose the sentences to regiment. Alternatively stated, before the regimentation procedure we
need to select a theory which we endorse as (approximately) true among a set of possible rival
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frameworks. Although the application of this method to classical physical theories1 is quite
unproblematic, since these frameworks are ontologically well-defined theories, in the quantum
context, as we will explain, one needs to do some work not only in order to choose what is
the best framework to apply it, but also to spell out its limits.
Analyzing the structures of classical theories, though remarkably different from one an-
other, it is possible to state that (i) these theories provide a clear ontology, specifying the
fundamental entities describing matter in space – typical examples are the particle ontology
instantiated by Newtonian mechanics or the field ontology proposed in Maxwell’s electromag-
netic theory – and that (ii) physical objects can be described individually by the maximal set
of properties they instantiate, whose values are independent of the performance of observations
and always well-defined.
Against this background, the physics concerned with molecules, atoms and sub-atomic
particles described by Quantum Mechanics (QM) calls into question a classical world-view.
Contrary to the classical case, in quantum theory physical objects cannot be specified in terms
of a maximal set of properties, since their values are not determinate until a measurement of
a particular magnitude is performed: isolated systems in QM are objects with indeterminate
properties. For instance, reconsidering the previous example, the sentence ∃xE(x) commits
us to the existence of quantum objects without well defined position and momentum in space,
since Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations forbid the possibility to simultaneously measure with
arbitrary precision the values of these magnitudes, concluding that electrons (and all quan-
tum particles) do not have both a well defined position and a definite momentum. Thus,
given the truth conditions imposed by QM, the application of Quine’s method would imply a
commitment to a quite peculiar ontology. However, one may object that it is not necessary to
expect the retention of a classical world-view in quantum contexts. This objection, although
fair, cannot resist that the peculiarities of QM are derived from conceptual and technical dif-
ficulties affecting its mathematical structure, like the measurement problem or the presence
of mathematically ambiguous notions appearing within its axioms. Hence, these conundrums
prevent us from considering it as a coherent description of the physical phenomena existing
at the quantum length-scales.
These facts suggest that one should look for a quantum theory that is immune to the con-
ceptual difficulties affecting its standard formulation. To overcome the problematic aspects of
QM a significant number of interpretations and alternative formulations have been presented.2
In this paper we will consider the Primitive Ontology (PO) approach, a philosophical perspec-
tive which tries to solve the quantum puzzles by providing a precise methodology to construct
physical theories with a well-defined ontology – that is, theories which specify the theoretical
entities representing matter in space and how they behave. These frameworks recover by
construction the explanatory scheme of classical physical theories providing descriptions and
explanations of quantum phenomena and processes in terms of well-defined entities moving
and interacting in space and time, therefore avoiding obscure ontological statements about
the indefiniteness of quantum objects. Notable examples, among others, are the Ghirardi-
Rimini-Weber spontaneous collapse theories, in particular the variants GRWm and GRWf
implementing a matter density field or flash ontology respectively, Nelsonian mechanics or
Bohmian Mechanics (BM). In this essay we will concentrate on the latter proposal to show
a possible way to recover a clear ontological commitment in the quantum realm. We will
argue that since BM provides better explanations and descriptions of physical objects and
1The expression “classical physical theories” refers to a set of theories covering an extensive spectrum of
scales, from descriptions of microscopic gasses provided by classical statistical mechanics, to cosmological
effects treated by Einstein’s theory of gravitation. Broadly speaking, they apply up to the length/energy
scales where quantum interferences cannot be neglected.
2Jaeger (2009) and Lewis (2016) discuss several proposals in detail.
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processes at the quantum length scales, there are arguments to prefer BM over QM, and thus
to consider the former a better candidate to apply Quine’s method in the quantum context.
Nevertheless, we will also discuss the general validity of this method and its limitations in
the context of quantum physics, arguing that the PO perspective improves on this method to
establish one’s ontological commitments.
2 Ontological Commitments in Standard Quantum Mechanics
Although the appearance of the quantum hypothesis dates back to the first decade of the
XXth century, with Planck’s heuristic solution to the black-body radiation and Einstein’s
subsequent application to explain observational data concerning the photoelectric effect, the
first coherent formulations of QM were proposed only in the mid-Twenties. On the one hand,
Heisenberg, Born and Jordan developed matrix mechanics in their Drei-Männer-Arbeit, an
algebraic formulation of quantum theory where physical magnitudes are expressed by means
of matrices evolving in time, on the other, starting from de Broglie’s relation, Schrödinger de-
veloped his wave mechanics, where physical states are represented by wave functions evolving
in space and time according to a diffusion equation.3
Although the mathematical structures and the starting assumptions of these representa-
tions are profoundly different, their physical equivalence has been proved soon after. However,
for a rigorous and systematic presentation of QM one should have waited until the textbooks
of Dirac (The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, 1930) and von Neumann (Mathematische
Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, 1932). Remarkably, the von Neumann-Dirac formulation
of quantum theory is, with minimal modifications, currently referred to as the “standard” or
“textbook” formulation of QM.4 In this paper we stick to this interpretation to introduce the
basic principles of the theory.
2.1 The von Neumann-Dirac Principles of Quantum Mechanics
According to this formulation of QM, also known as Princeton interpretation (see Jaeger
(2009), p. 117), a quantum system is described by a state vector |ψ〉, element of a complex
vector space called Hilbert spaceH, providing a complete specification of its properties. In QM
only operationally accessible properties are considered magnitudes of quantum systems; they
are represented by positive, linear Hermitian operators A, acting on H. Given a measurable
quantity A, its possible values are the eigenvalues (real numbers) of the associated operator
A, whereas possible states in which a system may be found after a measurement of A are
represented by the eigenvectors of A. Implicitly we have defined the eigenvalue-eigenstate
link, a core tenet of the von Neumann-Dirac formulation. With Dirac’s words:
The expression that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particular state
is permissible in quantum mechanics in the special case when a measurement of
the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so that the state is in
an eigenstate of the observable [. . . ]. In the general case we cannot speak of an
observable having a value for a particular state, but we can speak of its having an
average value for the state. We can go further and speak of the probability of its
having any specified value for the state, meaning the probability of this specified
3For a detailed account of historical developments of QM the reader should refer to Jammer (1974) and
Seth (2013).
4Bub (1997) labeled this interpretation the “basic approach” to QM. Landsman (2017), p. 2, provides a
concise discussion of the differences between Dirac’s and von Neumann’s approach.
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value being obtained when one makes a measurement of the observable. (Dirac
(1947), p. 253)
As correctly pointed out by Jaeger, this quote eloquently characterizes the idea that quantum
systems in isolation do not instantiate properties with definite values; consequently, quantum
mechanical objects possess indefinite properties prior experimental observation, a significant
ontological difference w.r.t. classical objects. Unlike the classical case, (i) properties of quan-
tum systems are not independent of observations, which become central in the microphysical
context, and (ii) the theory provides only probabilities for the possible measurement outcomes,
as clearly expressed by the next postulate, the Born’s rule. This axiom is crucial to connect
the abstract Hilbert space formulation of QM with experimental results, and states that if
the vectors |ψ〉, |φ〉 represent two different physical states of a given system, there exists a
probability p(|ψ〉, |φ〉) to find |ψ〉 in the state |φ〉, given by the squared modulus of their scalar
product on H p(|ψ〉, |φ〉) = |〈ψ|φ〉|2.
The last two axioms of QM concern the dynamical evolution of physical systems. In the
first place, the evolution in space and time of quantum systems is governed by a deterministic
partial differential equation, the Schrödinger Equation5 (SE):
i~
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = Hˆ|ψ〉. (1)
SE has several properties among them linearity, implying that if two state vectors |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉
are both possible solutions of the same SE, then their linear combination (superposition)
|ψ〉s = α|ψ1〉+ β|ψ2〉 is still a solution of the same SE.6 Thus, the new superposed state |ψ〉s
is also a consistent representation of the system.
This fact is the peculiarity of quantum mechanics, since in classical context |ψ〉s would
represent a different state w.r.t. its superposed components. To better understand the effect
of this shift, suppose to measure the z-spin of a quantum particle: the eigenstates in which it
is possible to find it are only “z-spin-up” and “z-spin-down”, but from linearity follows that
also the superposition “z-spin-up and z-spin-down” is a consistent description of the state in
which the particle may be. This entails that prior to a spin measurement the particle has
indefinite spin, being neither in the z-spin-up state nor in the z-spin-down state.7
However, since in experimental observations such superpositions are never revealed, von
Neumann and Dirac introduced the notion of projection of the state vector, which is distinctive
of this formulation of QM. Suppose we measure a certain quantity represented by the operator
A with eigenvalues ai and eigenvectors |j〉: if the system is described by |ψ〉, the Born’s rule
gives the probability to obtain a specific aj as measurement outcome, p(aj) = |〈j|ψ〉|2. After
the measurement’s performance the system is projected into one of the possible eigenstates.
Considering our previous example, the observation of the particle’s z-spin (the interaction
between the quantum particle and the experimental apparatus) causes a suppression of the
SE and of the superposition with the consequent stochastic jump of the system in one of the
possible spin eigenstates. These stochastic “jumps” make QM inherently probabilistic; Dirac
viewed them as “unavoidable disturbance” of quantum systems in measurement situations:
When we measure a real dynamical variable ξ, belonging to the eigenvalue ξ′, the
disturbance involved in the act of measurement causes a jump in the state of the
5In SE i is the imaginary unit, ~ = h/2pi is the reduced Planck constant and Hˆ is the Hamiltonian operator
representing the sum of kinetic and potential energy of the system.
6Here |α|2, |β|2, with α, β ∈ C, represent the probabilities to find the system in |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 respectively.
The normalization |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 means that with certainty we will find the system in one of the possible
eigenstates.
7Hooker (1975) contains famous no-go theorems which prove the contextual nature of quantum theory.
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dynamical system. From physical continuity, if we make a second measurement of
the same dynamical variable immediately after the first, the result of the second
measurement must be the same as the first. Thus after the first measurement has
been made, there is no indeterminacy in the result of the second. Hence after the
first measurement is made, the system is in an eigenstate of the dynamical variable
ξ, [. . . ]. In this way, we see that a measurement always causes the system to jump
into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigenvalue
this eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result of the first measurement (Dirac
(1947), p. 36, reported in Jaeger (2009), p. 120).
Again, before the first measurement, the system’s state is inherently indeterminate, since its
properties depend strictly upon the act of observation. It is worth saying that the projection
postulate has been introduced to reconcile the postulates of quantum theory with experi-
mental evidence: assuming (i) that state vectors provide a complete description of quantum
systems and (ii) that their motion would have been entirely described by the SE alone, the
superposed states would have been amplified to the macroscopic scale. Thus, also macroscopic
objects could have been in a superposition, contradicting the uniqueness and definiteness of
measurement outcomes. This is the essence of the famous Measurement Problem (MP) of
quantum theory, which can be stated more clearly as follows:8
1. State vectors provide a complete description of quantum systems;
2. State vectors evolve according to a linear dynamical equation (SE);
3. Measurements have a unique determinate outcome.
Any pair of these statements is consistent and entails the falsity of the third one, but their
conjunction generates inconsistencies with experimental evidence. Reconsidering the z-spin
example, the device we use must have a ready state pointing in a neutral direction before the
measurement, and two different pointers indicating different directions, let’s say left (L) and
right (R), representing the possible eigenstates in which we may find the system after the
observation, z-spin up and z-spin down respectively. Feeding a particle in an eigenstate of
x-spin into the classical device one obtains the following superposition in virtue of the SE:
1√
2
(|x− up,L〉+ |x− down,R〉).
Thus, a microscopic superposition is amplified to macroscopic scale until a measurements is
performed. However, since we never observe macroscopic superpositions, SE cannot provide a
complete dynamical story for quantum objects. Experimental practice suggests that quantum
systems are also subjected to stochastic jumps when they interact with measurement devices
causing the instantaneously suppression of the unitary evolution. These interactions clearly
have a macroscopic effect, namely the state of the experimental apparatus will be correlated
with the eigenstate (and relative eigenvalue) in which the quantum system will be found,
so that we can actually observe a definite measurement result. This is the content of the
projection postulate.9
8For a detailed discussion of the MP one may refer to Maudlin (1995) and Lewis (2016). For a historical
presentation of the quantum theory of measurement Jammer (1974) is still unsurpassed.
9It should also be clear why quantum probabilities naturally emerge from the theory’s formalism: if ob-
servations suppress SE leading to stochastic jumps, and if the state vectors provide complete descriptions
of the quantum system, then the measurements’ results must be inherently probabilistic, since they do not
reveal pre-existing values of some property instantiated by quantum systems. Then, indeterminacy must be
interpreted as an intrinsic feature of the quantum realm and should not be interpreted as “lack of knowledge”
about initial conditions of quantum systems.
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Nonetheless, although the projection postulate makes the quantum formalism consistent
with experimental evidence, it does not provide a good solution to the MP. In the first
place it implies an indispensable, arbitrary and not precisely defined division between the
observed system, which could also include the experimental apparatus, and the observer, who
concludes every act of observation:10 not only nothing in the formalism refers to the notion of
observer, though it plays a fundamental role in the theory, but also the axioms of QM do not
provide any description or explanation of the processes responsible for the suppression of the
deterministic evolution provided by the SE. Thus, the notion of measurement, albeit pivotal
within these axioms and taken as an unexplained primitive concept, is neither mathematically,
nor physically well-defined.
In sum, the projection postulates introduces an inconsistency between the dynamical
laws governing the temporal evolution of quantum states, since it is not clear why and how
measurement interactions cause the interruption of the continuous motion provided by the SE;
in other words, the reasons which make “being observed” and “not-being observed” a relevant
physical distinction for quantum systems remain entirely obscure. In addition to this, there
is no explanation of what distinguishes a measurement interaction from a non-measurement
interaction:
[w]hat the traditional theory did not do is state, in clear physical terms, the
conditions under which the non-linear evolution takes place. There were, of course,
theorems that if one puts in collapses somewhere between the microscopic and the
macroscopic, then, for all practical purposes, it doesn’t much matter where they
are put in. But if the linear evolution which governs the development of the
fundamental object in one’s physical theory occasionally breaks down or suspends
itself in favor of a radically different evolution, then it is a physical question of
the first order exactly under what circumstances, and in what way, the breakdown
occurs. The traditional theory papered over this defect by describing the collapses
in terms of imprecise notions such as “observation” or “measurement” (Maudlin
(1995), p. 9).
Hence, having underlined these problematic aspects of QM, to apply Quine’s method will
lead to be ontologically committed to a peculiar world, where the nature of molecular, atomic
and subatomic objects is not only inherently indeterminate, but this indeterminateness is
moreover due to the problems related with the notion of measurement and observer. One
should therefore look for a better theory to regiment.
10However, von Neumann explicitly denied the active role of the observer’s consciousness in measurement
situations: “no matter how far we calculate [. . . ] at some time we must say: and this is perceived by the
observer. That is, we must always divide the world into two parts, the one being the observed system, the
other the observer. In the former, we can follow up all physical processes (in principle at least) arbitrarily
precisely. In the latter it is meaningless” (von Neumann (1955), p 419). It is sufficient, then, to say that
the observer’s experience must be consistent with registered events in experimental situations. Indeed, even
though observers play a crucial role in von Neumann’s view, Whiteman (1971), p. 71 notes that this in-
terpretation is fully consistent with metaphysical realism: “the classical tradition of simply located objects
characterized independently of experiment, was presupposed by Born and von Neumann and imposed on the
data with the help of an informal language of ‘particles’ and ‘states’ ”. Thus, although conceptually problem-
atic, von Neumann’s theory does not attribute to observers any creative role. Be that as it may, despite the
heterogeneous personal beliefs on ontological matters there was no consensus among the fathers of the theory
about its ontological content; see Guicciardini and Introzzi (2007) for historical details.
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2.2 Princeton and Copenhagen
Under many respects the von-Neumann-Dirac formulation of QM differs remarkably from the
Copenhagen interpretation, which was mainly developed by Bohr and Heisenberg.11 In the
first place, Bohr never introduced explicitly the projection postulate, nor did he apply the
quantum formalism to experimental devices being strongly convinced that one should describe
them classically, in virtue of the limited knowledge available of quantum systems expressed by
the uncertainty relations; thus, quantum descriptions must be supplemented by classical con-
cepts. Furthermore, not only the results of quantum measurements are necessarily expressed
in terms of arrangements of macroscopic objects, but also the experimental procedure must
be controllable and communicable in order to provide an objective description of quantum
phenomena:12
it is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope
of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in
classical terms. (Bohr (1958), p. 39)
Hence, measurement is a central notion in QM also according to Bohr’s view, since prop-
erties of quantum objects strictly depend on the devices used in measurement situations: the
changing experimental set-up will necessarily affect the nature of quantum systems. With
Bohr’s words:
The unambiguous account of proper quantum phenomena must, in principle, in-
clude a description of all relevant features of the experimental arrangement [. . . ].
In the case of quantum phenomena, the unlimited divisibility of events implied in
such an account is, in principle, excluded by the requirement to specify the exper-
imental conditions. Indeed, the feature of wholeness typical of proper quantum
phenomena finds its logical expression in the circumstance that any attempt at a
well-defined subdivision would demand a change in the experimental arrangement
incompatible with the definition of the phenomena under investigation. (Bohr
(1963), p. 3)
Following this interpretation of QM, in agreement with the Princeton school, quantum
objects have indeterminate properties in isolation. However, a central tenet of Bohr’s view
absent in the previous formulation of quantum theory is the complementarity principle. In QM
information concerning quantum systems is obtainable only through measurements, however,
there are pieces of information that cannot be obtained simultaneously given the incompati-
bility of experimental protocols, so that they cannot be represented by a unique quantum state
of the examined system. Thus, the information obtainable by incompatible experiments is
complementary. For instance, quantum objects have been claimed to have both corpuscular
and wave descriptions, although it is not possible to show both these traits in a single obser-
vation, given the incompatibility of experimental procedures. To this regard, (Stapp (2009),
p. 113) claims that “any preparation protocol that is maximally complete, in the sense that
all the procedures are mutually compatible and are such that no further procedure can add
any more information, can be represented by a quantum state, and that state represents in
a mathematical form all the conceivable knowledge about the object that experiments can
11Interestingly, it is also controversial whether one may properly individuate a unitary set of accepted theses,
given the significant divergences between the supporters of this ‘interpretation”. In this regard the reader may
refer to Howard (2004) and Beller (1996). For lack of space, here we concentrate only on a few aspects
concerning the theory of measurement.
12Landau and Lifshitz (1981) in their monumental textbook on QM ironically recognized that classical
mechanics should emerge as a limit of QM, but the latter needs the former for its foundations.
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reveal to us”. Since quantum states represent the complete description of physical systems, it
is clear that the nature of quantum objects essentially depends on experimental protocols and
measuring devices and that observations do not reveal any pre-existing values of properties at-
tributed to quantum systems. Interestingly, pairs of properties measurable with incompatible
experimental protocols, such as momentum and position, cannot be revealed simultaneously,
in agreement with Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations.
Instead the Princeton interpretation provides a different account of experimental situa-
tions: on the one hand, experimental protocols do not play a role in determining the properties
of a quantum object, on the other, non-commuting observables cannot be measured simul-
taneously not having a set of common eigenstates. Thus, clearly, the von Neumann-Dirac
interpretation provides a remarkably different explanation for the indeterminateness of quan-
tum objects. Be that as it may, the theory remains silent about the ontological status of
quantum objects in isolation:13
the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena will
involve an interaction with an agency of observation not to be neglected. Accord-
ingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed
to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation. After all, the concept of ob-
servation is in so far arbitrary as it depends on which objects are included in the
system to be observed. (Bohr (1934), p. 3)
As clearly expressed, also in this interpretation the division between classical and quan-
tum regimes is as vague as the definition of the physical processes taking place during the
interaction between quantum systems and classical devices. Furthermore, also in this case,
the stochastic interruption of the SE in measurement situations does not find any precise
description, nor explanation, so that it does not provide any satisfactory solution to the MP.
Thus, also this interpretation of QM being based on the notion of measurement, inherits every
conceptual problem presented in the previous paragraph.
Taking into account a different Copenhagenist understanding of the quantum state, it
is interesting to consider Heisenberg’s subjective interpretation, which was mainly advanced
in the Fifties.14 According to this account, the quantum state is a representation of the
experimenter’s knowledge of a particular quantum system. The later Heisenberg said that:
When we are observing objects of our daily experience, the physical process trans-
mitting the observation of course plays only a secondary role. However, for the
smallest building blocks of matter every process of observation causes a major
disturbance; it turns out that we can no longer talk of the behavior of the par-
ticle apart from the process of observation. In consequence, we are finally led to
believe that the laws of nature which we formulate mathematically in quantum
theory deal no longer with the particles themselves but with our knowledge of the
elementary particles. The question whether these particles exist in space and time
“in themselves” can thus no longer be posed in this form. We can only talk about
the processes that occur when, through the interaction of the particle with some
13Jaeger (2009) Chap. 3 and references therein provide a careful reconstruction of Bohr’s philosophy.
14The young Heisenberg was committed to a much more objective view of QM, being closer to Bohr ideas.
In the Twenties he relegated the subjective element of quantum theory to the ignorance expressed by the
probability function, which provides only a description of an ensemble of possible events, or potentialities,
borrowing the Aristotelian terminology. These potentialities disappear in measurement situations. However,
the subjective element in Heisenberg’s view does not refer to the consciousness of the observer which is inactive
in observational processes.
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other physical system such as a measuring instrument, the behavior of the particle
is to be disclosed (Heisenberg (1958), pp. 99-100).
This reading of the quantum state was also shared by other notable supporters of the
Copenhagen interpretation, like Pauli or Peierls, who explicitly claimed that the statements
of QM express fundamentally our knowledge of quantum systems.15
Accepting this interpretation of QM implies not only that a description of isolated quantum
objects is unobtainable, but also that quantum mechanics is no longer a mechanical theory,
i.e. a framework providing descriptions and explanations of quantum phenomena in terms of
objects moving and interacting in space and time. QM becomes an epistemological theory
concerned the notion of knowledge of human observers implying a shift from an object-oriented
ontology to a framework which describes the evolution (the updating) of agents’ knowledge
of some physical system. Therefore, the ontological commitment provided by a subjective
reading of the wave function concerns agents’ beliefs and remains silent on the ontological
status of the physical systems these beliefs are about.
In sum, if one applies Quine’s method to these interpretations of QM either one is com-
mitted to the existence of objects with indefinite properties, or one is led to a subjective
interpretation of QM that does not specify what kind of objects populate the quantum realm.
3 A Realist View in QM: the Theory of Local Beables
In order to solve the conundrums afflicting the standard formulation of QM, (Bell (1987),
Chap. 7) proposed to focus the attention of physicists and philosophers working on the foun-
dations of QM on the ontological problems deriving from its axioms. To formulate a set of
principles not containing ill-defined notions, Bell’s proposal was to spell out clearly, also in
the quantum context, the ontology of a given physical theory T via the specification of the
set of theoretical entities with a reference to physical objects localized in space-time. Thus,
he introduced the neologism beable, from the English verb to be, indicating what elements of
a given physical theory T refer to or represent real objects in the world and their properties,
in opposition to what is only observ -able, which plays a dominant role in the standard for-
mulation of QM. To state it concisely, Bell’s theory provides a specification of the primitive
ontology of a given theoretical framework.16
Considering a physical theory T , its primitive ontology17 is a metaphysical assumption
defining the entities which cannot be further analyzed and in terms of more elementary no-
tions.18 These entities are the variables appearing in T ’s equations with a direct physical
meaning, i.e. referring to (what according to T are considered) real objects precisely localized
and moving in 3-dimensional physical space (or in 4-dimensional space-time). Furthermore,
every physical phenomenon included in T ’s domain is ontologically reduced and explained via
the dynamical evolution in space of these fundamental objects according to the particular
laws of motion governing the behaviour of the PO, recovering in the quantum context the
15This view contributed also to the development of Quantum Bayesianism, the most prominent contemporary
subjective interpretation of QM.
16Here we consider the expressions “primitive ontology” and “local beables” synonyms since a precise assess-
ment of their differences goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
17The reader may refer to Allori (2013) and Esfeld (2014a) for a more detailed explanation of this notion.
18The PO contextually depends on the theoretical framework in which it is assumed. To this regard, Allori
(2013), p. 65 explicitly claims that “there is no rule to determine the primitive ontology of a theory. Rather,
it is just a matter of understanding how the theory was introduced, it has developed, and how its explanatory
scheme works”.
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satisfactory and efficient explanatory scheme of classical physical theories. In this respect, we
may also claim with Bell’s words that
[t]he beables must include the settings of switches and knobs on experimental
equipment, the currents in coils, and the reading of instruments. “Observables”
must be made, somehow, out of beables. The theory of local beables should
contain, and give precise physical meaning to, the algebra of local observables
(Bell (1987), p. 52).
This is to say that the primitive variables must connect T to our macroscopic ontology. It is
worth noting that the theory of local beables follows the Bohrian idea for which “the account
of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms”: via the specification of the PO the
vague expression “classical terms” acquires a precise meaning, since also the classical devices
used to measure quantum properties are constituted by the beables of the theory, and are
therefore treated in a mathematically and physically rigorous way as clearly stated in the
above quotation.
The central tenet of the PO approach to quantum physics is that every well-defined phys-
ical theory must satisfy the following requirements:
1. A physical theory T aims to provide a careful description of a specific domain of our
world and to explain a specific set of phenomena;
2. To provide this description, T must implement a specific primitive ontology of objects
moving in physical space (3-dimensional or 4-dimensional). These objects are funda-
mental in two senses: (i) they are not reducible to more elementary notions, (ii) the
macroscopic objects of our ordinary experience must be reduced to the motion in space
of the primitive variables;
3. T must provide a set of dynamical laws governing the motion of the PO;
4. The mathematical structure of a given theory is naturally divided in two sub-structures:
on the one hand, there are objets with a direct physical meaning, i.e. those entities
referring to real objects in physical space, and on the other there are mathematical
structures without a direct reference to physical objects.
These features constitute what Allori (2013) defines as the common structure shared by
the PO theories. Bohmian mechanics is an explicit example of such a theory. We will employ
it to illustrate how the theory of local beables allows to solve the problems affecting the
standard formulation of QM.
3.1 An explicit Example: Bohmian Mechanics
Bohmian mechanics is an alternative formulation of QM fully developed by the physicist David
Bohm in two fundamental papers Bohm (1952a) and Bohm (1952b) and nowadays used by
several theoretical physicists and quantum chemists.19
BM is a deterministic quantum theory of particles which move in three-dimensional phys-
ical space and follow continuous trajectories. Albeit this theory is statistically equivalent
to the standard QM, their physical content is remarkably different since the former makes
19The reader may refer to Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009) for a historical reconstruction of the theory
and to Freire (2015) for a sociological analysis of the elements involved in the abandonment of the Bohmian
ideas. Dürr and Teufel (2009) is an excellent mathematical exposition of BM, whereas Oriols and Mompart
(2012) is concerned with some specific applications.
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a precise metaphysical hypothesis concerning the intrinsic corpuscular nature of matter. In
BM every physical fact is reduced to the motion of the Bohmian particles, which always have
definite positions independently of any observation.
According to this theory, physical systems are described by a couple (ψ,Q), where the first
element is the usual wave function and the second represents a specificN -particle configuration
with positions (Q1, . . . , QN ); these positions constitute the additional variables introduced by
BM. The dynamics is composed by two laws of motion: on the one hand, the wave function
ψ evolves according to the usual SE (1), on the other, the motion of Bohmian particles is
governed by the so-called guiding equation:
dQ
dt
= vψt (Q). (2)
The vector velocity field on the right-hand-side in (2) explicitly depends on the wave
function, whose role is to guide the motion of the particles. The solutions of the guiding
equation are integral curves corresponding to particles’ trajectories.
From (2) it is easy to note that BM is a non-local theory, in perfect agreement with
Bell’s theorem. However, it is important to stress that there is no inconsistency with special
relativity since Bohmian particles do not travel faster than light, thus, these non-local effects
cannot be used to send signals at superluminal speed. Therefore, no operational contradiction
with relativity arises.
The last step we have to make in order to complete our brief presentation of BM is
to guarantee the empirical, or statistical, equivalence w.r.t. the predictions of QM. The
empirical equivalence is achieved via equivariance: if at any arbitrary initial time t0 the
particle configuration is distributed according to |ψt0 |2, then it will be so distributed for any
later time t, preserving the Born’s distribution (see Dürr et al. (2013), Chapter 2 for the
mathematical justification of this statement).
The motivations to consider BM as a serious alternative to the standard quantum theory
are very well known: not only the notorious measurement problem vanishes, but also BM does
not rely on physically ill-defined notions such as measurement and observer, present instead
in the axioms of standard QM. It is important to state that BM restores on the one hand an
ontology of particles, and on the other an epistemic interpretation of the quantum probabil-
ities. The stochastic nature of the theory is a manifestation of our ignorance concerning the
exact positions of the particles: according to BM, the maximal information at our disposal is
always given by |ψ|2, and randomness must be interpreted as a lack of knowledge absolutely
detached from whatever sort of ontological indeterminacy of the quantum particles.20
Having qualitatively introduced the bare bones of the theory, let us now discuss how it
solves the MP. Consider a wave function which is in a superposition of two possible eigenstates
of a two-valued operator (for instance the spin of a particle in one of the three possible
directions):
ψ = α1ψ1 + α2ψ2
with |α1|2+|α2|2 = 1. Before the measurement we assume that the pointer of the experimental
device is in the ready state Φ0, where the possible pointer positions will be Φ1,Φ2, indicating
the possible eigenstates in which we may find the system after the observation. We label them
position 1 and 2 for simplicity.
According to quantum theory we know that, given the deterministic evolution provided
by the SE, from the initial state in which the system under consideration and the appara-
tus are independent (and described by a product wave function), we obtain a macroscopic
20For details Dürr et al. (2013), chapter 2, sec. 4-7. For a recent review of the literature on quantum
probabilities in BM see Oldofredi et al. (2016).
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superposition:
∑
i=1,2
αiψiΦ0
Schro¨dinger−−−−−−−−→
evolution
∑
i=1,2
αiψiΦi.
The great merit of Bohmian mechanics comes from a simple idea: to describe quantum
mechanically even the experimental apparatus, so that also macroscopic objects as the mea-
surement devices are composed of Bohmian particles. This is in perfect agreement with Bell’s
theory of local beables introduced a few lines above.
In BM this experimental situation is described by a couple (X0, Y0) where the former
variable refers to the initial configuration of the particles of the system and the latter to the
configuration of the particles that compose the apparatus at the initial time t0. Then, given
(1) and (2), the total configuration of particles (X0, Y0) evolves into another configuration
(Xt, Yt) at time t > t0 which is one of the possible eigenstates of the measured operator: the
pointer will point to position 1 with probability |α1|2 and to position 2 with |α2|2. (For a
detailed exposition see Dürr and Teufel (2009), Chap. 9.)
Considering the theory of measurement in BM, it would be immediately clear how mea-
surement results of whatever observable depend strictly upon (i) the initial particle configura-
tion of the system, which comprehends the observed system and the experimental apparatus
(which receives a quantum mechanical treatment in this context), and (ii) the dynamical
equations of the theory, so that the final outcome is completely determined by the evolution
in space and time of the total configuration of the particles involved (for details see Chap.
9 of Dürr and Teufel (2009) and Bohm (1952b) sections 2, 3). Furthermore, contrary to the
case of standard QM, in BM there is no collapse of the wave function: the dynamics of the
system depends on the laws of motion governing the beables of the theory which prescribe a
continuous spatiotemporal evolution. Once one looks at the final configuration of particles,
then one finds the pointer in one of the possible (macroscopic) positions corresponding to one
of the possible outcomes. This means that within this theoretical framework nothing induces
or causes stochastically the result of a given measurement. Thus, Bohmian mechanics avoids
by construction any reference to ill-defined notions: measurement outcomes receive an expla-
nation in terms of the motion of the beables in space, becoming functions of the primitive
ontology. An explicit example in the context of BM is contained in Dürr et al. (2004), where
the authors offer a carefully analysis of the reduction of spin measurements to position mea-
surements, and consequently to the dynamical evolution of particles (for details see especially
sec. 9).
The case of BM is generalizable to every theory implementing a clear PO, since these
frameworks provide a detailed theory of measurement to supply a rigorous description of the
physical processes taking place in measurements situations, and therefore a detailed expla-
nation of the obtained outcomes. This particular feature of the PO theories is crucial, since
measurement constitutes the only connection between a given theoretical framework and ex-
perience: “its analysis is therefore one of the most sensitive parts of any interpretation” [of
QM] (Jammer (1974), p. 471).
Ultimately, the macroscopic ontology of ordinary experience, to which experimental out-
comes belong, is grounded in the primitive variables of a given theory and their motion in
space and time, so that every physical fact within the theory’s domain is reduced to them.
In sum, we can agree with Bell in claiming that notions such as measurement, apparatus,
observable and so on should be derived from the primitive ontology. Observation is always
theory-laden and a specific theory of measurement should be inferred from the fundamental
structure of a theory, after all
[d]oes not any analysis of measurement require concepts more fundamental than
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the measurement? And should not the fundamental theory be about these more
fundamental concepts? (Bell (1987), p. 118)
3.2 The status of the Wave Function in BM
In contrast to the Copenhagen and the Princeton interpretations, BM offers an unambiguous
formulation of quantum mechanics in which neither vague notions appear, nor the MP arises.
Nonetheless, there is an open debate about its ontology (see e.g. Esfeld et al. (2014)): if
we apply the Quinean programme, the result is that we are committed to the existence of
the particles and the wave function, since the theory, if put in first order logic, quantifies
over both of them. Indeed, according to Bohm himself and some contemporary supporters
of his pilot-wave theory, like A. Valentini and P. Holland among others, the wave function is
conceived as a field in physical space.21 Hence, the sentence “there exists an electron”, ∃xEx,
in this formulation of BM indicates that there exists a particle with well-defined values for
position, mass and charge in physical space guided by a relative wave field, the wave function
of the electron in question.
However, for most interpreters this result is puzzling: the wave function is defined not
on three-dimensional space, but on configuration space – the mathematical space each point
of which represents a possible configuration of particles in physical space (for N particles,
configuration space accordingly has 3N dimensions). The puzzle then is how an object that
exists in configuration space could influence the behaviour of objects in physical space.
Since the debate about the status of the wave function is far from be solved, one may
conclude that, once again, answering this ontological question requires genuine philosophical
work instead of simply bringing these theories in the form of first order logic: before the
regimentation of the sentences of BM, therefore, we need a precise answer to the metaphysical
issue concerning the nature of the wave function. In this respect, the primitive ontology
programme can be conceived as an improvement on the Quinean criterion for ontology.
The PO, defined by the four criteria listed at the beginning of this section, is primitive also
in the sense that the entities that it poses enter a physical theory T as ultimate referents of
T , which are not defined by their function for something else. In brief, the primitive ontology
of a given theoretical framework is constituted by the set of those entities that, according to
T , exist simply in the world. According to this definition of primitiveness, the PO stands
in contrast to the mathematical structures of a theory without a direct reference to physical
objects; these latter ones are labeled non-primitive variables in Allori et al. (2008), where
the authors claim that the PO does not exhaust the entire ontology of a physical theory,
since it comprehends also the structures in the T ’s formalism whose function is to govern
the behavior of the beables. Here, we follow a more recent literature so that we call these
variables the dynamical structure of T , which is made up by all those parameters that are
introduced through their functional role for the evolution of those entities that constitute the
primitive ontology. The wave function is the central element of the dynamical structure of
BM, because it is introduced in terms of its functional or causal role for the evolution of the
particle configuration.
The dynamical structure is nomological in the sense that it represents the behaviour of
the elements of the primitive ontology, containing the parameters that are needed to formu-
late laws for the evolution of the beables. The distinction between primitive ontology and
dynamical structure makes evident why the ontological commitment points towards the PO
in the first place and why the ontological commitment to the dynamical structure is an open
issue, as stressed a few lines above.
21See Hubert and Romano (2018) for a recent defense of such a view about the wave function.
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In order to answer the question regarding the ontological status of the wave function and
the other non-primitive variables, it is certainly possible to apply any one of the philosophical
stances w.r.t. the natural laws to the dynamical structure as a whole: primitivism, according
to which the dynamical structure is a further primitive over and above the primitive ontology
(see e.g. Maudlin (2007) for that attitude with respect to the wave function); dispositionalism,
a view in which the dynamical structure refers to dispositional properties of the physical
objects in which the laws are anchored, think e.g. of gravitational mass in classical mechanics
(dispositionalism with respect to the wave function in BM is set out in Belot (2012) and in
Esfeld et al. (2014)); Humeanism, where the dynamical structure is part of the best system –
that is, the system that achieves the best balance between simplicity and informational content
in representing the evolution of the elements of the primitive ontology – and hence does not
call for an additional ontological commitment (that attitude is developed with respect to the
wave function in Miller (2014), Esfeld (2014b), Callender (2015), Bhogal and Perry (2017)).
In a further step, one may then move on from the primitive ontology of a given theory to
primitive ontology tout court, that is, seek to work out a proposal about what the entities are
that simply exist in the world, given our best physical theories. The rationale for doing so is
that naturalistic metaphysics strives for an ontology of the natural world that is not relative
to particular physical theories. One may even go as far as claiming that it is inappropriate to
speak of the ontology of this or that theory. Ontology is about what there is. It goes without
saying that our access to what there is comes through the representations that we conceive
in terms of physical theories. But this does not necessarily imply that ontology is relative
to particular theories. In other words, the idea for a fundamental ontology is to search for
an answer to the following question: What is a minimal set of entities that form an ontology
of the natural world, given our well-established physical theories? An accredited candidate
for an answer to that question, both in classical and in quantum physics, is an ontology
composed by point particles that are characterized only by their relative positions (that is,
by their distances to each other) and the change in position (see Esfeld and Deckert (2017)
for making the case for that answer).
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the PO approach provides a sound methodology to construct
theories avoiding the difficulties affecting the standard formulation of QM: according to this
framework, the structure of a physical theory is well-defined if and only if its basic entities
are specified and their equations of motion are given. In this manner, one is able to obtain
an explanation of physical phenomena in terms of the evolution of the primitive ontology in
space.
From our discussion it emerged that Quine’s method is not rich enough to distinguish
between the mathematical structures provided with a direct physical meaning and those which
are not; therefore, it cannot be alone a secure guide to one’s ontological commitment in
microphysical contexts, not only given the pitfalls inherent to the quantum formalism, but
also since the ontological status of the wave function is not definitively established, so that it
still depends contextually on one’s interpretation of ψ. It is clear, then, that one’s ontological
commitment depends on the answer given to this question. To this regard, however, the
major methodological contribution conveyed by the PO is that the mathematical, physical and
philosophical aspects of a particular theoretical framework should be clearly separated, so that
it is always possible to interpret its elements (primitive and non-primitive) unambiguously.
The main message of this paper, therefore, is to consider the PO programme as a useful guide
in search for an ontology in the quantum realm to be added to Quine’s method.
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Furthermore, this perspective has been recently extended also to the realm of Quantum
Field Theory (see Struyve (2010) and references therein for an overview as well as, most
recently, Deckert et al. (2017)) where, once again, Bohmian theories show the concrete pos-
sibility to consistently apply the PO methodology to recover QFT’s phenomenology via the
definition of ontologically clear alternative formulations. Although these theories may be still
speculative or involve a partial reformulation of quantum field theory, they have the merit to
show possible solutions to the conceptual issues present in the standard formulation, indicating
a way to find a clear ontology also in the quantum theory of fields.
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